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GETTING IN AND OUT OF THE HOUSE: THE
WORLDS OF IN-HOUSE COUNSEL, BIG LAW,
AND EMERGING CAREER TRAJECTORIES OF INHOUSE LAWYERS
Eli Wald*
INTRODUCTION
The traditional story of in-house counsel is of a transformation and triumph
over “Big Law” in a zero-sum game for power, prestige, and money.1 That
story, however, is inaccurate descriptively, prescriptively, and normatively.
Descriptively, in-house lawyers were part of the legal elite dominating
corporate counseling before large law firms first rose to power and
prominence. In-house counsel then lost ground and the position of general
counsel to Big Law lawyers between the 1940s and 1970s, only to mount an
impressive comeback to elite status beginning in the 1970s. Yet the in-house
comeback was not a simple power struggle with Big Law. Rather, modern
in-house lawyers including the “new” general counsel came from within the
ranks of Big Law, an offshoot rather than a competitor of large law firms,
sharing Big Law’s background, training, and, more importantly, professional
values, ideology, and ethos. Thus, the story of in-house lawyers and their
relationship with Big Law is one of a complex symbiotic affiliation, not a
competitive zero-sum game.
Discrediting the standard zero-sum game account and accurately
describing the in-house counsel–Big Law relationship as a symbiotic
codependency is not merely a matter of correcting the historical record.
Rather, the standard story is incapable of answering basic questions about
corporate law practice. For example, if in-house counsel triumphed over Big
Law in a zero-sum game, why have in-house lawyers gained only limited
control over outside counsel and core legal functions of the corporation?
Why are some large law firms prospering when they should be declining?
Moreover, if in-house counsel won, why are some in-house lawyers moving
* Charles W. Delaney Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
This Article was prepared for the Colloquium on Corporate Lawyers, hosted by the Fordham
Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October 11, 2019, at Fordham
University School of Law. A special thanks to Arthur Best, Sung Hui Kim, Russ Pearce,
David Wilkins, and participants in the Colloquium for their feedback, and to Michelle Penn,
faculty services liaison at the Westminster Law Library at the University of Denver Sturm
College of Law, for her outstanding research assistance.
1. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749.
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back to Big Law? In contrast, the symbiotic understanding of the Big Law–
in-house relationship reveals answers to all of these questions: rhetoric aside,
in-house lawyers never sought to strip outside counsel of their power and
control and, given their dependence on Big Law, in-house lawyers were
never in a position to accomplish such a goal. Instead, the symbiotic
codependency between in-house and Big Law lawyers explains both the
continued success of some large law firms and the emergence of a two-way
street between in-house departments and Big Law.
In turn, the revised account raises normative questions about the roles and
ideologies of in-house and Big Law lawyers and, indeed, of the entire legal
profession. Critics have long lamented the inability and unwillingness of
corporate lawyers to act as gatekeepers and dissuade their entity clients from
wrongdoing. The symbiotic relationship between in-house and outside
counsel both questions the self-proclaimed ability of in-house lawyers to act
as the conscience of their entity clients and further undercuts the role of
outside counsel as lawyer-statespersons. On the other hand, the welcoming
of in-house lawyers into the mainstream of corporate law practice may
enhance their professional standing and identity and empower them to act as
gatekeepers.
This Article is organized in three parts. Part I examines the rise, fall, and
comeback of in-house lawyers over the past century. In revising and
correcting the standard story of in-house practice, Part I makes two
contributions to the existing literature: (1) disproving the zero-sum thesis, it
explores the complex symbiotic relationship between in-house and Big Law,
shedding new light on corporate law practice; and (2) it offers, for the first
time, an account of in-house practice in the twenty-first century. Part II
explains how the symbiotic relationship resulted in in-house counsel
achieving only partial control over the provision of corporate legal services,
allowing some large law firms to continue to thrive, and explores how the
codependency led to the emergence of a two-way Big Law–in-house street
and the rise of a robust in-house lateral market. These phenomena reflect the
increased integration of the elite in-house and Big Law worlds, at the same
time as the in-house universe itself expands and increasingly stratifies.
Finally, Part III offers preliminary thoughts about the meaning and impact of
the practice developments described in Parts I and II for in-house counsel,
Big Law lawyers, the legal profession, and the public.
I. THE RISE, FALL, AND COMEBACK OF IN-HOUSE LAWYERS
“[One] of the most significant changes in corporate legal practice in the
United States,”2 has been the rise to prominence of in-house lawyers over the
last fifty years. Once upon a time “castigated,”3 belittled as “house

2. Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global
Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1057 (1997).
3. Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and
Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 479 (1989).
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counsel,”4 and perceived to be lawyers “who had not quite made the grade as
partner[s],”5 some general counsel now “sit[] close to the top of the corporate
hierarchy as member[s] of senior management,”6 having gained power,
prestige, and respect.7 Yet, this remarkable transformation was not the first
time in-house lawyers were part of the legal profession’s corporate elite.
Rather, “[f]or a generation after the Civil War to be general counsel of a
railroad was to hold the most widely esteemed sign of professional success.”8
Indeed, the second and third decades of the twentieth century were “the
golden years of corporate counsel—a time when their professional and
business service was considered critical and repeatedly sought by
management,”9 before in-house lawyers experienced a long decline from the
1940s through the mid-1970s.10 Thus, the story of in-house lawyers over the
past century is one of a swinging pendulum: up, down, and back on top
again.
Telling the story of in-house lawyers accurately, from the evolution of
their roles and practice over time to their background, identity of their entity
clients, and career trajectories, matters descriptively, prescriptively, and
normatively. Descriptively, getting the story right reveals important insights
about the practice of law, the evolution of legal elites, their relationships, and
the development of career trajectories and roles over time.11 Prescriptively,
an accurate understanding of the rise, fall, and resurgence of in-house counsel
explains contemporary practice realities and provides clues about the future.
Normatively, the rise, fall, and comeback of in-house lawyers shed light on
the desirable, as well as the not so attractive, roles and ideologies of the legal
profession.
A. The First-Generation In-House Lawyers of the Gilded Age: Post–Civil
War to the 1930s
As “both business and legal advisers,” first-generation in-house counsel
“were held in high repute and their sage counsel was regularly sought” by

4. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J.
1011, 1011 (1997).
5. Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37
STAN. L. REV. 277, 277 (1985). Although, as Carl Liggio astutely points out, Big Law was
hard at work perpetuating this perception. Carl D. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate
Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1201, 1203 (1997).
6. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 5, at 277.
7. Rosen, supra note 3, at 479; see also Hazard, supra note 4, at 1011; Omari Scott
Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory of the In-House Counsel Role,
41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 79–80 (2011).
8. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 297
(1950).
9. Liggio, supra note 5, at 1201–02 (documenting the high compensation of corporate
counsel and the legal background of many chief executive officers).
10. Id. at 1202–03.
11. Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
955, 958 (2005).
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members of senior management.12 Evidencing their elevated status of power
and influence,13 general counsel were paid approximately 65 percent of the
chief executive officer’s (CEO) compensation and usually were among a
corporation’s three most highly compensated individuals.14
These general counsel were part and parcel of the Gilded Age’s emerging
White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) elite, established lawyers of the era
who read law.15 In terms of their career trajectories, they were drawn from
within the ranks of federal and state court judges16 and were being groomed
to become CEOs:
It was common at this time for companies to groom a member of their legal
department to become CEO. Indeed, more than 75% of corporate CEOs in
America had a legal background during this period, as businesses
recognized the added value a legal education (and the analytical tools
associated with that education) offered to their business concerns.17

Like the robber barons they served, these general counsel were
entrepreneurs: “[g]eneral counsel often assumed critical roles in arranging
solutions to the financing challenges that confronted businesses in need of
investment capital in an era when capital markets were less developed in
depth and size.”18 According to James Willard Hurst, corporate finance and
mergers and acquisitions work for railroads were key to “a whole new field
of corporate counseling.”19 In-house lawyers became “familiar figure[s] on
boards of directors; first the railroad general counsel, and then the lawyer for
the investment banker led the way.”20
The new fields of corporate counseling, governance, finance, and mergers
and acquisitions, in turn, fueled the birth and gradual growth of the modern
large corporate law firms, featuring the “Cravath System.”21 Importantly,
these large law firms,22 like the general counsel themselves, were also
12. Carl D. Liggio, Sr., A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel: Back to the Future—
or Is It the Past?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 621 (2002).
13. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 490 (3d ed. 2005).
14. Liggio, supra note 5, at 1202.
15. HURST, supra note 8, at 297–98.
16. “In the post–Civil War period, judges were lured from federal and state courts by the
attractions of serving as general counsel to railroads.” DeMott, supra note 11, at 958–59.
17. Constance E. Bagley et al., Who Let the Lawyers Out?: Reconstructing the Role of
the Chief Legal Officer and the Corporate Client in a Globalizing World, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
419, 432–33 (2016) (footnote omitted).
18. DeMott, supra note 11, at 958.
19. HURST, supra note 8, at 298.
20. Id. at 342.
21. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS:
THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 9–10 (1991); WAYNE K. HOBSON, THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, 1890–1930, at 196–99 (1986); 1
ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS: 1819–1947, at 1–3 (1946).
22. “Large” has a dynamic meaning in a historical context. “[N]o firms of large
membership appeared, even in the great cities, until the end of the [nineteenth] century. The
typical partnership was a two-man affair . . . .” HURST, supra note 8, at 306. Through the
1920s, a firm of four attorneys was considered a “large” firm. HOBSON, supra note 21, at 161.
The benchmark for “large” reached fifty attorneys by the 1950s. See Erwin O. Smigel, The
Impact of Recruitment on the Organization of the Large Law Firm, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 56, 58
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innovators, simultaneous newcomers to the legal profession.23 Rather than
competitors, the emerging corporate law firms were initially contemporaries
of general counsel, cut from the same WASP cloth24 and serving the same
new legal needs for fast-growing entity clients.25 The coexistence was aided
by the relatively small number of large law firms,26 which benefitted from
stable client relationships,27 featured lawyers with similar ethnoreligious,
class, and cultural identities as compared to those of the dominant in-house
elite,28 as well as their different professional backgrounds and aspirations.
Whereas general counsel were established judges being groomed for
promotion to CEO, the founders of the new law firms were younger,
ambitious lawyers seeking to advance and claim elite status.29 Yet the seeds
of rivalry and competition between in-house counsel and outside counsel
were sowed; whereas general counsel were part of the legal profession’s oldschool elite, founders of the new law firms were out to establish themselves
as the new professional elite.30
B. Second-Generation “House Lawyers,” 1940s–1970s
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, the development of new business
and management bodies of knowledge and expertise led to the increased
professionalization of corporate management.31 The professionalization of
corporate management gradually led to the demise of the earlier generation
of in-house counsel who were esteemed counsel to management. The old
model of the wise general counsel, steeped in practical wisdom but ignorant
of new business-related bodies of knowledge, no longer fit the emerging
management style, and they were relegated to secondary advisors on narrow,
routine legal questions.32

(1960). By the late 1960s, “large” meant one hundred lawyers. See ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE
WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? 358–59 (1964). By the late
1980s, “a firm of 50 members probably would not be considered large” in major cities. See
Justin A. Stanley, Should Lawyers Stick to Their Last?, 64 IND. L.J. 473, 473 (1989). Notably,
in 1988, Baker & McKenzie became the first law firm with over one thousand attorneys. See
generally Nancy Blodgett, Law Firm Tops 1,000 Barrier: Chicago’s Baker & McKenzie,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 30; Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament:
A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1873 n.23 (2008)
(discussing the dynamic meaning of “large” firms).
23. Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1803, 1806–10 (2008); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 484.
24. Wald, supra note 23, at 1806–10.
25. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 486.
26. Richard Abel, The Paradoxes of Pro Bono, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2443, 2446 (2010).
27. Bryant G. Garth & Carole Silver, The MDP Challenge and the Context of
Globalization, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903, 922 (2002).
28. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 487.
29. Id.
30. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 24 (1976); Wald, supra note 23, at 1810–28.
31. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1475–76 (1989).
32. Liggio, supra note 5, at 1202.
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This new professionalized corporate management found a willing ally in
the new elite of the legal profession, the large law firms.33 During the Gilded
Age, while general counsel reigned supreme, Christopher Columbus
Langdell and the formalists advocated for and established legal education as
a science34 and built an alliance with the new growing large law firms.35
Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and later other law schools established themselves
as the elite of legal education. At the same time, Paul Cravath and other
innovators introduced the Cravath System and, with it, the concept of
associates, who were hired directly out of these elite law schools.36 These
two institutions—the large law firm and the law school—helped establish
each other’s elite status. Law, recognized as a formal science, taught as a
professional applied science at law schools, and practiced as such at the
emerging corporate law firms37 was exactly the kind of service
professionalized management needed. Thus, the professionalization of
corporate management strengthened the position of outside elite large law
firms as one-stop shops specialized in corporate legal advice.38 The new
corporate law firms, aligned with elite law schools, established themselves
as the legal elites by the 1930s and replaced first-generation in-house lawyers
as general counsel. Over time, as the legal needs of entity clients expanded,
large law firms effectively bundled specialized services with general, more
routine corporate legal services. This expansion of legal services served the
interests of both parties: the large law firms used the influx of work to
support their tournament of lawyers’ partner-to-associate ratios, to provide
their associates with work, and to grow. The entity clients used their
affiliation with the by then recognized elite of the legal profession—Big
Law—to legitimize and establish the elite credentials of their newly
professionalized management.39
The formalists’ establishment of law as a science emphasized independent
exercise of professional judgment as a constitutive ingredient of legal
practice.40 Law was independent of other bodies of knowledge, a self33. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 21, at 20–36.
34. ROBIN L. WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF
PROFESSIONALISM 43–92 (2014); Eli Wald, The Contextual Problem of Law Schools, 32
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 281, 295 (2018).
35. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO
THE 1980S, at 51 (1983) (From the beginning of the twentieth century, “the elite law schools
were seen as increasingly bent on serving corporate law firms . . . . The elite law schools grew
alongside the burgeoning corporate law firms.” (footnotes omitted)); see also AUERBACH,
supra note 30, at 28–30 (describing the symbiotic relationship between elite law schools and
elite corporate law firms, matching the so-called best law students with the “best” law firms).
36. Wald, supra note 23, at 1810–25.
37. WEST, supra note 34, at 70–82.
38. SWAINE, supra note 21, at 575 (Paul Drennan Cravath’s “first great object was so to
organize his firm and its staff as to make it competent to do, as nearly perfectly as it could be
done, any acceptable work which might be offered. . . . Prior to the time when Cravath took
control as the active head of the firm, there had been little attempt at scientific organization in
the office.” (quoting Cravath partner Carl August de Gersdorff)).
39. Wald, supra note 23, at 1810–25.
40. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16 (1988).
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contained professional zone, which “required” self-regulation and monopoly
over the provision of legal services.41 Large law firms aggressively pushed
this agenda, promoting their independence and independent exercise of
professional judgment by their partners as a cornerstone of legal
professionalism.42 This was the final death blow to the old, first-generation
in-house lawyers: not only were they not a product of the new, superior,
professionalized education offered by elite law schools but, as in-house
lawyers, they lacked the now respected and required independence of
judgment.43
In-house lawyers lost out. By the 1930s, graduates of leading colleges
flocked to elite law schools and the graduates of elite law schools flocked to
the Wall Street law firms.44 These elite outside-counsel law firms became
the new general counsel of corporate America. Ironically, the new elite law
firms were about to have a taste of their own medicine: just as the firstgeneration, golden era of in-house practice contained the seeds of its own
demise, so too did the golden era of Big Law contain the seeds of its relative
loss of power. At the same time that large law firms were growing, forces in
both corporate America and legal education were brewing to launch the
comeback of in-house counsel.
C. The New Breed: Third-Generation In-House Counsel, 1970s–2000s
As the growth and professionalization of business continued and
bureaucratized managerial hierarchies became the norm, the trend began to
hurt Big Law. Following legal realism and its offshoots, law was debunked
as an independent, closed system of science.45 Large law firms’ brand of
legal corporate advice had become outdated, replaced with “formal
procedures with prescribed contributions from a variety of experts—
financial, economic, public affairs, and legal—all of whom are located and
staffed from inside the corporation.”46 The growth and bureaucratization of
corporate America opened the door for the reemergence of in-house lawyers,
embedded in the organizational structures and procedures of entity clients, as
powerful actors.
At the same time, large and growing corporations had become the target
of an increased, complex body of federal, state, and municipal-level
regulation. Responding to and complying with this increasing maze of
regulatory activity,47 the rising salience of law as a feature of the corporate

41. Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639,
639 (1981).
42. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 22, at 1873.
43. Gordon, supra note 40, at 33.
44. AUERBACH, supra note 30, at 14–39.
45. WEST, supra note 34, at 28–35.
46. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 5, at 294.
47. Liggio, supra note 5, at 1203–04.
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environment,48 and the routine use of business litigation as a corporate
tactic,49 created a strong demand for legal services. Initially catered to by
rapidly growing large law firms at hefty premiums, over time, entity clients
began to pressure law firms to reduce the escalating costs of legal services.50
This provided fertile grounds for the emergence of in-house legal
departments who argued that they could handle routine tasks at lower costs.51
Corporate America’s growing legal needs increasingly demanded early,
proactive attention as a matter of right, rather than as a reactive matter of
attorney-client relationships.52 Just as corporations were trying to cap their
outside counsel’s mounting costs, they discovered that Big Law inherently
could not effectively and efficiently provide the full range of legal services
they needed. Even as large law firms were transitioning to offer 24/7,
around-the-clock hypercompetitive services,53 they were, by definition,
reactive and could not handle the masses of information one needed to
possess and master to effectively address the legal needs of their clients, seas
of associates and their billable hours notwithstanding. This had to be done
in-house.54 Moreover, Big Law’s traditional tournament structure, utilizing
relatively expensive associates’ billable hours to address the routine needs of
entity clients, proved excessively costly.
Big Law’s historically successful campaign to depict in-house lawyers as
second-class who “did not make partner with us” began to fail.55 On the one
hand, the growth of large law firms, and their increasingly common
hypercompetitive “eat what you kill” culture,56 made them less attractive to
some partners who began to seriously consider offers from their large entity
clients to go in-house. Over time, in-house practice became Big Law’s
greener pastures, capturing the professional aspirations of dissatisfied Big
Law lawyers.57 On the other hand, the increased specialization of the
practice of law meant that in-house practice was being perceived and touted
by new in-house professional organizations, such as the American Corporate
Counsel Association, as another corporate law specialty and no longer
48. Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs:
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457,
459 (2000).
49. Liggio, supra note 5, at 1203.
50. David Wilkins dubs this the “economic” claim of the in-house counsel movement. See
David B. Wilkins, The In-House Counsel Movement, Metrics of Change, LEGAL BUS. WORLD
(Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.legalbusinessworld.com/single-post/2017/01/20/The-In-HouseCounsel-Movement-Metrics-of-Change [https://perma.cc/ERK5-X5L8].
51. Id.
52. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 5, at 281; Rosen, supra note 3, at 525.
53. Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender
Stereotypes, and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
2245, 2245 (2010).
54. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 5, at 281; Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice
as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255, 281–82 (1990).
55. Eli Wald, In-House Myths, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 407, 426.
56. See generally MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL
STREET LAWYER (2004).
57. Wald, supra note 55, at 408.
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frowned upon.58 Against these background conditions, it is hardly surprising
that the in-house political movement, led by the very distinguished general
counsel who made the move from Big Law, successfully resulted in the
growing self-esteem and perceived status of in-house lawyers.59
In a pioneering study, Robert Nelson and Laura Beth Nielsen constructed
a set of three categories mapping the range of roles, tasks, and lawyering
styles of these third-generation general counsel. First, there were “cops,”
whose role was primarily a gatekeeping one, in which they relied on their
legal expertise to give rule-based legal advice assessing legal risks.60
Second, “counsel” who engaged in gatekeeping but relied on both legal and
institutional knowledge to give legal and business advice.61 And third,
“entrepreneurs” who understood their role to encompass a lot more than mere
law avoidance and compliance and relied on legal, managerial, and economic
knowledge to give law and business advice.62 Importantly, Nelson and
Nielsen observed that “inside counsel play different roles in different
circumstances,”63 yet conceded that the categories were more of ideal types
than overlapping roles.64
These ideal types mapped onto the identity of the new in-house and general
counsel. As well-respected graduates of elite law schools and elite large law
firms (that is, as former senior partners), the new general counsel were well
versed, trained, mentored, and suited to serve as cops at their new corporate
homes.65 The long-standing relationships they and their law firms had with
their entity clients in the 1970s through the 1980s and 1990s provided them
with deep institutional knowledge that lent itself to the counsel role.66
Finally, as the elite, self-proclaimed lawyer-statespersons of the era, some
felt empowered to act as entrepreneurs.67
Thus, in-house lawyers made a gradual comeback to power and elite status
beginning in the 1970s and through the late 1990s, reclaiming the general
counsel title and role from outside counsel. Notably, however, some of the
similarities to the first-generation in-house elite were superficial. While inhouse lawyers were once again the elite general counsel, many features of
their identity and practice were different than those of their first-generation
predecessors: the “new” elite general counsel came from within the ranks of
Big Law, sharing the professional values and vision of client-centered
58. Hazard, supra note 4, at 1012.
59. David B. Wilkins, Is the In-House Counsel Movement Going Global?: A Preliminary
Assessment of the Role of Internal Counsel in Emerging Economics, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 251,
251–52.
60. Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 48, at 462–70.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 463.
64. Id. at 462–63.
65. David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals?: Toward a New Model of the Corporate AttorneyClient Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2076–85 (2010).
66. Id.
67. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 271 (1993).
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service.68 Unlike the previous clash between first-generation in-house
counsel and large law firms, in which the rival lawyers had different
credentials, status, and professional aspirations, and in which the success of
the latter came at the direct expense of the former, third-generation in-house
lawyers grew up in and were socialized into the legal profession in Big Law.
While the new in-house lawyers deployed aggressive rhetoric, promising
entity clients that they would curtail the high costs of large law firms and
deliver superior legal services,69 the realities on the ground differed greatly.
While some new general counsel tried to build large, more efficient, inhouse legal departments modeled after Big Law,70 for the majority of inhouse lawyers, the mission was to effectively manage and supervise the work
of their old firms.71 Notably, most in-house lawyers did not set out to replace
Big Law; they wanted and needed to work with large law firms to address
their clients’ needs. The large entity clients of the mid- and late twentieth
century were radically different from their predecessors in the nineteenth
century. They were huge, global, professionalized, institutionalized, and
bureaucratized compared to their century-old predecessors and required both
in-house and outside counsel assistance.72 Moreover, and as importantly, the
new in-house lawyers spent as much time establishing themselves and their
contributions internally vis-à-vis skeptical corporate constituents as they did
combating outside counsel.73
Indeed, it is important not to portray the in-house comeback as an easy
undertaking or to mischaracterize the challenges faced by in-house lawyers
as primarily concerned with their love-hate symbiotic relationship with
outside counsel. For many third-generation in-house lawyers in the 1970s
and 1980s, the primary challenge was on the home front, being accepted and
trusted internally within the entity client by nonlawyer management and
employees.74 In-house lawyers were often viewed as outsiders who did not
understand or care about the business aspects of the client, naysayers who
were cost centers standing in the way of business objectives, productivity,
and efficiency.75 In this sense, describing aspects of the role of in-house
lawyers as cops assumed a meaning different than helping clients ensure
regulatory compliance and lawful conduct. Being thought of as cops
68. See generally ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1988).
69. Wilkins, supra note 50 (summarizing the “economic” and “substantive” claims of the
in-house counsel movement).
70. Between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, Corporate Legal Times published an
annual survey of the largest legal departments, occasionally including an “industry breakout.”
See, e.g., The 200 Largest Legal Departments, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2005, at 32. See
generally Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation,
33 J. CORP. L. 497 (2008).
71. Rosen, supra note 3, at 487, 500–01.
72. JOSHUA B. FREEMAN, BEHEMOTH: A HISTORY OF THE FACTORY AND THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN WORLD 226–313 (2018); ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW
AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 231–55, 377–95 (2018).
73. Wald, supra note 55, at 424–39.
74. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 5, at 277; Liggio, supra note 5, at 1203–05.
75. Id.

2020]

CAREER TRAJECTORIES OF IN-HOUSE LAWYERS

1775

reflected the mistrust and ambivalence of some corporate constituents toward
their new in-house counsel.76 Thus, third-generation in-house lawyers
prioritized establishing trust and their place at the corporate decision-making
table and being recognized as valuable team players.77
Still, in-house lawyers returned to power, leading some commentators to
observe that “outside law firms largely have lost the function of general
counsel and instead focus increasingly on the provision of specialized
services on a case-by-case, transaction-by-transaction basis.”78 Other
commentators even mistakenly predicted the death of Big Law.79 This
mistake was twofold: misunderstanding the new in-house elite and
misreading the realities in Big Law. The new in-house elite was all bred at
large law firms, sharing Big Law lawyers’ educational background, culture,
professional ethos, and ideology.80 Thus, while the new general counsel
certainly were tasked and incentivized to cut the escalating bills of Big
Law,81 the third generation of in-house lawyers had no reason, no interest,
and little ability to bring Big Law down. That is, unlike the 1930s, in which
Big Law lawyers intentionally targeted second-generation in-house lawyers
as outdated, dependent, “did not make partner” failures,82 the comeback
third-generation in-house elite had no inherent animosity toward Big Law.
Relatedly, it is imperative to remember the context of immense growth in
size and profits of Big Law through the 1990s, at the same time as in-house
lawyers completed their comeback. While the elite of Big Law remained
relatively stable,83 new large law firms emerged, others were growing fast,
and all were raising rates annually up to an unsustainable 10 percent,84 in the
context of a changing culture featuring a more explicit emphasis on the
financial bottom line. Profits-per-partner were on the constant rise and Big
Law mobility peaked.85 Against this background, the entity-client push to
curb costs ought to be understood as cutting not lean and mean legal fees but
out of control, escalating legal bills. The stage was set not for the death of
Big Law but rather for a market correction and the end of the “good times”
of the 1980s and the 1990s.

76. See, e.g., TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015) (exploring the role
of cops in the context of the mistrust and ambivalence of racial communities in which police
officers are pursuing their tasks).
77. Liggio, supra note 5, at 1219; Wald, supra note 55, at 424–39.
78. Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 48, at 458.
79. See generally Ribstein, supra note 1.
80. NELSON, supra note 68, at 231–69.
81. Wilkins, supra note 50.
82. Wald, supra note 55, at 424–27.
83. Wilkins, supra note 65, at 2080–85.
84. Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big but Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the
Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 20–38.
85. Id. See generally John Morley, Why Law Firms Collapse, 75 BUS. LAW. 1399 (2020).
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D. The Fourth Generation of In-House Counsel’s Symbiotic Relationship
with Big Law, 2000s–Present
By the early 2000s, in-house counsel completed their comeback, taking
the majority of the general counsel positions at large corporations from Big
Law. Along the way, the comeback transformed and, more accurately,
restored the status and prestige of in-house counsel as members of the
corporate legal elite. Since the 2000s, the world of in-house counsel has
experienced two trends:
(1) the continued growth, maturation,
institutionalization, and professionalization of elite in-house positions and
(2) the expansion of in-house positions outside of large entity clients.
First, in the large, elite corporate sphere, in-house departments grew in
size, streamlined and expanded the role of the general counsel, created new
tracks for other in-house lawyers, institutionalized, and professionalized.
The size of in-house legal departments increased significantly since the
1980s, “making internal counsel one of the fastest-growing segments of the
U.S. legal profession.”86 For example, one leading study “revealed that . . .
in 2006–2007 . . . the median legal department employed 35 lawyers, the
range in size was quite significant, with some companies having almost
completely outsourced their legal function and others maintaining legal
departments of more than 1,000 lawyers.”87
As in-house departments grew, they streamlined the role of the general
counsel.
Today’s elite general counsel, following the maturation,
professionalization, and institutionalization of their roles between the mid1970s and the mid-2000s, simultaneously occupy the roles of cops, counsel,
and entrepreneurs.88
Elite general counsel are advisors to senior
management and, often, the board of directors. Advising about situations or
transactions, some general counsel act as cops, others as counsel, and yet
others as entrepreneurs. Yet acting as futurists purporting to discern and
advise about likely trends of law and business and advising regarding
strategic and informal planning inherently cuts across the cop-counselentrepreneur divide. One cannot act as a futurist or a strategic planner by
only wearing the narrow legal hat of a cop. For example, in advising senior
management about “forward-looking systematic programs,” one must rely
on and take advantage of nonlegal “traditional management techniques.”89
The job description transcends being a cop and forces elite general counsel,

86. Wilkins, supra note 50.
87. Id.
88. Comparing their findings to earlier studies of in-house lawyers, Nelson and Nielsen
found that their subjects were more likely to act as counsel and entrepreneurs and less likely
to act as cops. Nelson & Nielson, supra note 48, at 468–70. Notably, Nelson and Nielsen
interpreted their findings to suggest a shift in general counsel’s understanding of their role. Id.
In hindsight, rather than a changing understanding of role, the authors were
contemporaneously documenting the evolution of the very role of elite general counsel from
one inherently grounded in legal expertise to one requiring equal measures of law, business,
and leadership skills and expertise. Id.
89. James F. Kelley, The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1197, 1198 (1997).
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even those more comfortable reverting back to the role of a cop, to wear their
counsel and entrepreneur hats.
Next, elite general counsel select and retain outside counsel, supervise the
work of outside counsel, oversee routine legal matters handled by the inhouse legal department, oversee and sometimes conduct routine and even
major litigation, and quarterback special projects.90 Some of these tasks, like
supervision of outside counsel and routine legal matters, are inherently legal
and tend to gravitate toward the cop and counsel roles. Yet, others, like the
selection and retention of outside counsel, litigation, and special projects,
organically move general counsel past legal knowledge and the role of a cop
and toward the roles of counsel and entrepreneur.
Elite general counsel also fulfill administrative and managerial roles. As
administrators, general counsels preside over both legal and nonlegal
processes, which require them to marshal not only legal knowledge but also
the business of law and related bodies of knowledge such as information
management.91 As managers, general counsel contain costs and are expected
to increase the productivity of the in-house legal department, impose controls
on outside counsel such as budgets and risk analysis techniques—explicitly
managerial and not legal procedures—stay abreast of and utilize new
technologies, and acquire continued nonlegal education. All of these require
the institutional knowledge of counsel and the skills and judgment of an
entrepreneur. Some general counsel have even assumed responsibility for
compliance.92
In yet another sign of the maturation, professionalization, and
institutionalization of the role of general counsel who are more secure in their
elite status within and outside their entity clients, general counsel insist that
they continue to wear the hat of a legal professional and assume
responsibility for matters such as pro bono, interaction with the judiciary, and
active involvement in bar associations, including both the Association of
Corporate Counsel and other non–in-house specific organizations.93 The
claim corroborates Nelson and Nielsen’s finding that elite general counsel
meaningfully adhere to their professional identity as lawyers, even as their
role requires them to master nonlegal bodies of knowledge and expertise.94
90. See Liggio, supra note 5, at 1210.
91. Id. at 1213–16.
92. See Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an
Era of Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 203, 203 (2016); Deborah A. DeMott, The Crucial but
(Potentially) Precarious Position of the Chief Compliance Officer, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 56, 63–64 (2013); John B. McNeece, The Ethical Conflicts of the Hybrid General
Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 677 (2012); see also
The Emergence of Compliance: A New Profession?, PRACTICE (July–Aug. 2016),
https://thepractice.law.harvard.edu/article/the-emergence-of-compliance
[http://perma.cc/
GST2-N6GH].
93. See, e.g., PRASHANT DUBEY & EVA KRIPALANI, THE GENERALIST COUNSEL: HOW
LEADING GENERAL COUNSEL ARE SHAPING TOMORROW’S COMPANIES 163–70 (2013); BEN W.
HEINEMAN, THE INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION: RESOLVING THE PARTNER-GUARDIAN TENSION
317–57 (2016); E. NORMAN VEASEY & CHRISTINE T. DI GUGLIELMO, INDISPENSABLE COUNSEL:
THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER IN THE NEW REALITY 97–130 (2012).
94. See Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 48, at 477–78.
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Moreover, even at a rhetorical level, the claim is symbolically significant as
it reveals the professional aspirations of elite general counsel, living through
the fourth-generation evolution of their roles. No longer concerned with
securing their position within the entity, these lawyers now seek to become,
or at least portray themselves as, the “integrity” officers of their clients,
charged with asking and answering not only “is it legal?” but also “is it
right?” when no one else at the entity does.95 Importantly, elite general
counsel aim to ask and answer both questions, not only in their capacity as
cops but also in their roles as counselors and entrepreneurs or, as these
lawyers prefer to term it, “accountable leaders.”96
Thus, fourth-generation elite general counsel are not merely cops, counsel,
and entrepreneurs. They are also explicitly business leaders. It is in this
latter capacity as entrepreneur-leaders that these lawyers speak of their
entities as pursuing a core mission of “the fusion of high performance with
high integrity.”97 They also assert that their own role includes a new fourth
component in addition to cop, counsel, and entrepreneur-leader—that of a
high integrity officer, one that builds on and derives from their identities as
lawyers and charges them with “resolving the partner-guardian tension.”98
The significance of this development cannot be overstated as it allows elite
general counsel to assert that they are the heirs to the dethroned Big Law
powerful partners of the twentieth century and the contemporary standardbearers of the lawyer-statesman ideal.99
This remarkable expansion and solidification of the general counsel’s role
is reflected in its title change, from general counsel to chief legal officer
(CLO). Whereas, in the past, the titles were used interchangeably, recently
their heightened public profile has helped to cement the general counsel’s
standing as a member of the company’s senior leadership team. Indeed,
many top in-house lawyers have traded in the legal-sounding title of general
counsel for the more corporate sobriquet of CLO to signal that they are part
of the company’s C-suite.100 Moreover, at some corporate entities, the
general counsel now reports to the CLO.101
Outside of the role of general counsel, in-house departments have grown
larger and more specialized. The growth and institutionalization of in-house
legal departments established new specialized tracks for lawyers interested
in permanent employment with entity clients without necessarily the
possibility of internal advancement, for example, as intellectual property or
95. HEINEMAN, supra note 93, at 23–128.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. But see generally Robert W. Gordon, The Return of the Lawyer-Statesman?, 69
STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2017) (critically questioning the plausibility of claims about elite general
counsel as lawyer-statespersons).
100. Wilkins, supra note 50; see also Omari Scott Simmons, Chief Legal Officer 5.0, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 1741 (2020).
101. Kristen Rasmussen, Chief Legal Officer v. General Counsel: Why You May Need
Both, LAW.COM (Feb. 7, 2019, 5:21 PM), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2019/02/07/chief
-legal-officer-v-general-counsel-why-you-may-need-both [http://perma.cc/T5ZN-YR7S].

2020]

CAREER TRAJECTORIES OF IN-HOUSE LAWYERS

1779

labor and employment law associate general counsel subject-matter
experts.102 It is not uncommon in some industries to observe a hierarchical
structure in which several associate and assistant general counsel, in
particular specialty areas such as intellectual property and labor and
employment law, report to the general counsel, as well as the proliferation of
more specialized in-house positions under such associate general counsel.103
Growing in-house departments rely heavily on aggressive recruiting from
the ranks of Big Law.104 This applies not only to senior partners but also to
junior equity partners, income partners, and even senior and mid-level
associates. The successful recruitment of large law firm lawyers has been
aided by a complicated mix of realities and myths about greater equality at
in-house legal departments compared to Big Law.105 On the one hand,
“women make up a significant percentage of the lawyers working in-house,
including twenty-five percent of the GCs of Fortune 500 companies,
according to a 2015 report from the Minority Corporate Counsel
Association.”106 This is consistent with, and may be explained in part by,
the harsh gender realities in Big Law, where women lawyers continue to be
significantly underrepresented in positions of power and influence. Indeed,
“[t]his percentage is far higher than the average number of female partners
in large U.S. law firms, let alone female managing partners or other senior
leaders, who remain a tiny percentage of those who hold these positions.”107
On the other hand, there is little evidence to support the advancement of
women lawyers in corporate America, other than the position of general
counsel, to other positions of power and influence within in-house legal
departments, in C-suites, or on corporate boards.
Second, outside the large elite corporate sphere, as the stereotype of inhouse lawyers as second-class citizens within the legal profession diminished
and was gradually replaced with the perception of in-house positions as
desirable and prestigious, in-house positions have begun to proliferate, with
new entity clients hiring their first in-house lawyers and other entities
expanding their in-house legal departments. This growth was not merely
driven by lawyers who were now willing, or even eager, to go in-house.
Rather, as the benefits conferred upon entity clients by in-house lawyers,
from early proactive compliance to reduced cost, became more visible and
known, smaller entity clients began to create and staff new in-house
positions. To be clear, only entity clients of a certain threshold size and
complexity of legal needs require in-house counsel. Yet the in-house trend
that arose in the 1970s and 1980s continues outside very large entities to take

102. Wald, supra note 55, at 432–34.
103. VEASEY & DI GUGLIELMO, supra note 93, at 159–90.
104. Wald, supra note 55, at 409–19.
105. Wilkins, supra note 50 (“[A]s in-house departments began to grow in size and status,
they also began attracting a significant number of female lawyers.”); see also Wald, supra
note 55, at 408–09.
106. Wilkins, supra note 50.
107. Id.
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hold in the large and mid-large entity client range.108 Notably, fourthgeneration in-house lawyers taking office in the expanding in-house world
outside of the elite sphere of large entity clients face and struggle with
challenges similar to those of third-generation in-house attorneys, namely
establishing trust internally with clients and overcoming the perception of
being a negative cost center.109
These twin developments—the growth, professionalization, and
institutionalization of in-house legal departments of large entity clients,
complete with the evolution of the elite general counsel role, and the
expansion of the in-house trend outside of large entity clients—have resulted
in an increasingly diverse in-house world, as well as in the fragmentation and
stratification of the in-house universe.110
Whereas many nonelite general counsel and in-house lawyers are living
through the third-generation in-house challenges of convincing corporate
insiders that they are team players and trustworthy, elite general counsel have
moved on to a more secure and mature stage. As such, the latter, no longer
engaged in the “establishing professional status project,” which they shared
with all in-house lawyers and which benefited the entire in-house universe,
are pursuing fourth-generation projects, which are at times at odds with the
interests of nonelite in-house counsel. Recall that third-generation general
counsel were well suited to play the roles of cops, counsel, and entrepreneurs
given their long-standing and secure relationships with their entity clients,
which in turn allowed them to grow over time into the role of integrity
officers.111 In contrast, fourth-generation general counsel who assume their
position without the benefit of these background conditions may not be
expected to act as integrity officers and, when the role expectations do exist,
they may find them hard to fulfill.
Thus, rather than featuring a neat universal world in which most in-house
lawyers have moved past the third-generation return to power, vis-à-vis
outside counsel and internal constituents within entity clients, to a fourth
generation of professionalization, institutionalization, and consolidation of
power, the complex diverse worlds of in-house lawyers consist of at least two
increasingly stratified tiers: (1) an elite general counsel fourth-generation
sphere and, simultaneously, (2) a nonelite universe of general counsel and
other in-house lawyers who are still fighting third-generation battles.

108. CLARA N. CARSON & JEEYOON PARK, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2005 (2012).
109. Wald, supra note 55, at 429.
110. On stratification in the legal profession between the individual and corporate
hemispheres, see JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319–20 (1982) (finding that the legal profession consists of two
categories of lawyers whose practice settings, socioeconomic and ethnoreligious backgrounds,
education, and clientele differ considerably); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE
NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 29–47 (2005) (documenting that lawyers work in two
fairly distinct hemispheres—individual and corporate—and that mobility between these
hemispheres is relatively limited).
111. See supra Part I.C.
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Accordingly, rhetoric aside, it is important not to overstate in-house
lawyers’ dominance and elite status in the twenty-first century. The large
universe of in-house lawyers, approximately 10 percent of all U.S. lawyers,
or more than 100,000 attorneys,112 is anything but a homogenous monolith,
and instead features rich diversity. In-house lawyers span private and public
practices, for example, as government lawyers.113 Some work in large-scale
in-house legal departments, whereas many others are the sole entity
lawyer.114 Next, whereas some in-house lawyers are generalists who oversee
all legal matters on behalf of their entities, others are specialists with a narrow
subject-matter expertise.115 Moreover, while some in-house lawyers work in
centralized in-house departments reporting to a general counsel, others
practice in decentralized settings and report to nonlawyer managers.116
Finally, in-house lawyers vary by “locale, gender, position in organization,
seniority in organization, nature of prior experience, and status of law school
attended.”117
Recognizing the great diversity within the in-house realm reveals an
important insight: not all in-house lawyers have experienced a growth in
power, prestige, and influence. Rather, this transformative change has been
primarily the domain of a small, elite subset, the general counsel of large
corporations.118 Early on, these elite general counsel used their power to
advocate for elevated professional status for all in-house lawyers, in what
Robert Eli Rosen described as the political mobilization of an “inside counsel
movement.”119 Such efforts included the formation in the mid-1980s of the
American Corporate Counsel Association,120 as well as notable rhetorical
moves. For example, Carl Liggio introduced the “employed” and “retained”
lingo in lieu of “in-house” and “outside” to capture and reflect the new power
dynamic in which employed in-house lawyers exercise power over and retain
outside counsel.121 Thus, the rise to power of an elite subset of in-house
lawyers—general counsel of large corporate entities—initially set off an
ongoing campaign for elevated status for all in-house lawyers, only for the
lawyers to experience stratification and friction in the fourth generation.

112. CARSON & PARK, supra note 108.
113. See generally Miriam H. Baer, Compliance Elites, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599 (2020).
114. Hazard, supra note 4, at 1011.
115. Kelley, supra note 89, at 1197.
116. Id.
117. Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 48, at 461.
118. Some commentators have noted this important distinction in their titles but have not
explored in any detail the practice realities of nonelite in-house lawyers. See, e.g., Chayes &
Chayes, supra note 5; Daly, supra note 2; Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 48. Others have been
more casual, exploring the practice realities of elite general counsel while referring more
generally to general counsel. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 89; Liggio, supra note 5.
119. Rosen, supra note 3, at 497.
120. Our History, ASS’N CORP. COUNS., https://www.acc.com/about/our-history
[https://perma.cc/G5BA-M3JQ] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
121. Liggio, supra note 5, at 1202–03. Liggio’s choice of the term “employed” to denote
in-house lawyers also contrasted with the lesser term “salaried.” See generally EVE SPANGLER,
LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT WORK (1986).

1782

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

II. IN-HOUSE AND BIG LAW: CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE REALITIES
The traditional understanding of the relationship between in-house and Big
Law as a zero-sum game, in which the former won, should have resulted in
at least three related consequences in the market for corporate legal services:
(1) in-house counsel taking control of the core legal functions of the
corporation from outside counsel; (2) the decline of Big Law; and (3) a large
law firm exodus, a one-way street from Big Law to in-house legal
departments. None of these phenomena, however, have taken place. Rather,
in-house counsel have achieved only partial control over the provision of
corporate legal services,122 and some large law firms have never been better,
at least in terms of the profitability of their equity partners.123 The labor
market has experienced the emergence of a two-way Big Law–in-house street
and the rise of a robust in-house lateral market, all of which the revised
symbiotic account helps explain.
A. In-House Partial Control of Corporate Practice and the Enigma of the
Continued Success of Big Law
To begin with, if in-house lawyers triumphed over Big Law in a zero-sum
game, one would have expected at least two consequences: (1) in-house
lawyers gaining increased control over outside counsel and the core legal
functions of the corporation and (2) a corresponding demise of Big Law.
Neither outcome has transpired.
As to the expected dominance of in-house counsel over Big Law,
“[a]rguably the key feature of the in-house counsel movement in the United
States has been the effort to wrest control over the core legal functions of the
corporation away from outside counsel.”124 Yet, although in-house counsel
have purportedly triumphed, “the success of this effort has been mixed.”125
Specifically,
[n]otwithstanding a significant investment in building up in-house
capacities, many companies discovered that outside spending on law firms
continued to escalate throughout the 1990s and into the first decade of the
21st century. Similarly, the extensive monitoring and controlling of law
firm [sic] did not result in increased levels of client satisfaction.126

David Wilkins concluded that “[t]he result has been that GCs continue to
have less control over outside counsel than the movement’s rhetoric might
lead one to believe.”127 The author further explained that
while there had been an important shift in the degree of control that internal
counsel exercised over both the amount of work that is given to particular
122. Wilkins, supra note 50.
123. See, e.g., Ben Seal, The 2019 Am Law 100: Profits per Equity Partner, AM. LAW.
(Apr. 23, 2019, 9:38 AM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2019/04/23/the-2019-amlaw-100-profits-per-equity-partner [http://perma.cc/6NGG-MVXU].
124. Wilkins, supra note 50.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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firms, as well as the manner in which that work is assigned, evaluated, and
compensated, it was an exaggeration to view GCs as employing a strict
“spot contracting” model for the purchase of legal services.128

What explains this “mixed” result? Wilkins asserts a type of path
dependency: “In the words of one GC, terminating an important law firm
relationship is a bit ‘like turning the Titanic’—something that takes an
enormous amount of time and energy to accomplish and runs the risk of
creating an even bigger disaster in the process.”129 The colorful metaphor,
however, does not quite capture the path dependency argument accurately.
Exercising control over Big Law by replacing a large law firm with another
does not assume the risk of a disaster because arguably most large law firms
can competently handle complex and costly corporate work. Nonetheless,
the cost of replacing outside counsel is likely to be high, including the
external learning curve of the new law firm, the internal curve of corporate
constituents dealing with new lawyers, and the cost of developing and
adopting new templates. Importantly, such a costly change is unlikely to
result in significant savings as many large law firms follow a similar model
for the provision of legal services. Thus, path dependency provides in-house
counsel with little incentive to change outside counsel. Add to the mix the
relatively short-term tenures of the modern CLOs and their busy schedules
and exercising control over Big Law becomes even less of a priority.
The symbiotic account offers additional explanations for the limited
amount of control in-house counsel exercise over outside counsel and
corporate legal services more generally. First, as entity clients grew and their
needs expanded to require inside representation (the “substantive”
argument),130 the internal in-house growth was an incomplete substitute for
outside legal needs. That is, the legal needs of large global entity clients
mean that there is a need for both inside and outside legal services that are
not redundant. In-house lawyers, who serve in preventive and proactive
roles, can cover the routine tasks at a lower cost and also monitor outside
counsel work. Outside counsel, however, continue to provide specific
specialized expertise, “people power” when needed for major transactions or
litigation, and “bet the company” representations.
In theory, in-house counsel could have rejected the Big Law model of
outside legal services. For example, instead of trying to replicate the Big
Law model in-house or rely on it for outside legal services, general counsel
could have assembled a team of subject-matter experts inside the legal
department and relied on new, temporary, or alternative low-cost, nonelite
providers of legal people power as needed. Recall, however, that in-house
lawyers were not seeking to replace Big Law as part of a professionalism
project or a battle for status and standing. This is not a matter of simplistic
loyalty, a wink and a nod to their former Big Law colleagues at the expense
of the entity client. Rather, unlike replacing one large law firm with another,
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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which entails little risk but also offers little upside, replacing Big Law with a
nonelite alternative does entail the risk of lower quality legal services, a risk
that general counsel have little incentive to take. Relatedly, bred and brought
up in Big Law, in-house lawyers are familiar and comfortable with the large
law firm model. In-house counsel, simply put, have little reason to radically
rock the boat of corporate legal services and the stable symbiotic relationship
they have with Big Law.
Second, the particular growth pattern of in-house legal departments in the
late third and fourth generations explains the ongoing symbiotic
codependency. As in-house legal departments began to recruit mid-level
lawyers from Big Law, including junior partners and senior and mid-level
associates, these in-house lawyers often lacked the expertise of more
seasoned Big Law partners and thus had to continue to rely on outside
counsel for expertise.
Third, as long as the majority of in-house lawyers were trained, mentored,
and socialized in Big Law, their values and expectations were informed and
framed by Big Law structure, organization, and realities. Understanding
themselves to be elite attorneys and Big Law lawyers to be their peers, inhouse lawyers were unlikely to retain nonelite legal services and indirectly
undermine their own credentials and status.131
At the same time, the extent of the symbiotic codependency between inhouse legal departments and Big Law ought not be exaggerated. In
particular, in-house lawyers have successfully curtailed the legal costs of
outside counsel, not for necessary legal services but for the hefty premiums
of large law firms, for example, by insisting on fee caps, managing the
assignment of outside lawyers to their matters, and refusing demands for
annual fee raises at significant bumps. Similarly, in-house lawyers now
perform many of the routine and other legal tasks previously undertaken by
Big Law, cutting into large law firms’ profit margins. In-house lawyers also
gained some power by managing if not the content then the budgets, staffing,
and resource allocation of Big Law.
Large law firm partners, in turn, have lost power and influence to in-house
legal departments and their general counsel. Consequently, Big Law
experienced greater instability and increased competition.132 Yet, the
reasons for these practice realities are complex and are not all attributable to
the rise of in-house counsel, and Big Law cannot be fairly described to be in
a state of distress. To begin with, seemingly paradoxically, some large law
firms have never been better, judging by their profits per equity partner.133
The traditional Big Law tournament of lawyers organizational structure
depended on maintaining set ratios of partners to associates to generate
131. See NELSON, supra note 68, at 127–58 (exploring the professional identity of powerful
Big Law partners). See generally HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 110 (documenting lawyers’
understanding of professional identity in stratified practice arenas); HEINZ ET AL., supra note
110 (same).
132. Wald, supra note 53, at 2258–64.
133. See Seal, supra note 123.
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profits and growth, a model general counsel were able to disrupt, for
example, by refusing to pay for the training of junior associates and by
insisting on lean staffing of their matters. Some large law firms responded
by pursuing internal restructuring and the creation of new tracks within Big
Law, which resulted in fewer equity partners sharing the spoils.134 Other
large law firms resorted to the firing of some partners, the “de-equitization”
of others, and to installing longer paths to partnership, all leading to increased
stratification within Big Law.135 Importantly, however, this restructuring
was not solely the result of in-house pressures on Big Law. Rather, some of
these measures were adopted in response to demands by rainmaking partners
to abandon lockstep arrangements and to increase their compensation, all in
the context of increased mobility and the implied threat that failure to yield
may cause them to leave. Yet other large law firms have recently
experienced no growth or even reduced profitability.136 But these are coming
after years of unprecedented growth, rising fees, and increased profits per
partner, and in some cases are explained by either poor management or
explicit choices to forgo growth and sustain less competitive cultural and
institutional values.137
Next, the number of large law firms grew tremendously over the last few
decades such that the greater instability is explained in part not by loss of
revenue to in-house legal departments (the size of the pie) but rather by
internal competition (slicing the pie among a bigger group).138 Finally, while
it seems like more large law firms have collapsed in recent years, the reasons
have to do as much with the organizational and ownership structure of Big
Law as they do with the loss of business to in-house legal departments.139
In sum, the symbiotic codependency between in-house and outside counsel
explains why the former have expanded their roles, prestige, and power at
the expense of Big Law lawyers and yet have sought and obtained only partial
control over the latter and the provision of corporate legal services. The
revised account also explains why the relative decline of large law firms’
profitability has not led, and is not likely to lead, to the demise of Big Law.
The days of unchecked and annually rising fees are over, courtesy of in-house
counsel. Yet, Big Law can reasonably expect the continued flow of steady
expert work from large entity clients. Big Law volatility, instability, and
increased competition are likely to continue for the foreseeable future as the
“new normal” in the market for corporate legal services not exclusively
134. See generally William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus TwoTier Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691 (2006).
135. See Eli Wald, Smart Growth: The Large Law Firm in the Twenty-First Century, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 2867, 2868 (2012).
136. See GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. ON ETHICS & THE LEGAL PROFESSION & THOMSON
REUTERS, 2019 REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET 4 (2019),
http://ask.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.info/LEI_2019-State_of_Legal_Mkt
[https://perma.cc/26K7-G6GD] (“[S]ince 2014, demand has been slightly up in some years
and down in others, creating an essentially stagnant growth pattern over the past five years.”).
137. Id.
138. See Wald, supra note 23, at 1818–19.
139. See generally Morley, supra note 85.
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because of in-house lawyers but because of the high number of large law
firms competing in the marketplace and the dominance of the “eat what you
kill” culture in Big Law, as well as the outdated business models,
organization and structure of many large firms, and the vulnerability of some
to increased mobility and the lateral departure of their top rainmakers.140
B. In and Out of the House: The Emergence of Two-Way Street Career
Tracks
Had in-house counsel triumphed over Big Law in a zero-sum game, one
would have expected to see, over time, a one-way exodus from large law
firms to in-house legal departments, akin to third-generation practice
realities. The fourth-generation era, however, has featured much more
complex labor movements, consistent with the symbiotic account.
Through the first and second generations of in-house practice, and through
the first years of the third generation when Deborah DeMott first discussed
in-house pathways,141 there was relatively little to say about the career
trajectories of in-house lawyers. As we have seen, during the first generation,
general counsel, typically the only in-house lawyers working for the entity
client, were state and federal judges. These judges took in-house positions
with the fast-growing railroads and investment banks, expected to stay in the
positions for a while, and exited into groomed CEO positions or
retirement.142 Second-generation in-house lawyers were employed by
growing entity clients, which primarily utilized elite large law firms as their
outside general counsel. These lawyers were recruited from among the ranks
of those who did not make partner in Big Law firms143 and planned to stay
in-house permanently, in part because the low esteem of their positions was
not conducive to a high-power move and in part because mobility per se was
still unheard of. Finally, the modern-era general counsel of the third
generation had a fairly straightforward career trajectory: having spent the
bulk of their legal careers in Big Law and assumed the position of general
counsel late, many expected to stay and retire after serving the entity. This
simple world of in-house career trajectories is all but gone, replaced with a
vibrant maze of exciting new opportunities, career paths, and options.
Early third-generation in-house lawyers in the 1970s and early 1980s were
typically lateral hires from Big Law and thus were experienced, older,
Caucasian men.144 As a reflection of the then relatively stable and long-term

140. See generally id.
141. See generally DeMott, supra note 11.
142. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
143. See supra Part I.B.
144. Female lawyers began to enter the profession in growing numbers in the 1970s and
were promoted to partnership in the mid- to late 1980s. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass
Ceilings and Open Doors: Women’s Advancement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 291, 311–16 (1995). Thus, as a reflection of the Big Law partner pool, a vast majority
of first-generation in-house lawyers and general counsel were men.
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relationships between large law firms and their entity clients,145 an early inhouse hire was usually a partner who had long represented the entity client,
was familiar with it and its legal needs, and had gained its trust. The lateral
move was often welcomed by Big Law as it tended to cement the relationship
with the entity client, which was expected to continue to utilize the services
of its outside counsel when a former partner was installed as its general
counsel.146
As DeMott astutely explains, the first Big Law movers into in-house
positions were likely motivated by a combination of factors.147 First, the
long-term, stable relationship with the client implied relative stability in the
new position, which was increasingly appealing given increased competitive
practice realities at large law firms and their emerging “eat what you kill”
culture (DeMott’s “law firm contrast” thesis).148 Second, to attract partners
holding prestigious positions in Big Law to resign what were then de facto
tenured positions, entity clients offered their new general counsel compelling
compensation packages (the “economic” thesis).149 Third, given the stature
and experience of the new hires, as well as their stable relationships with the
client, the position was a good fit in terms of the talent, skills, and
expectations of the new general counsel (the “fit” thesis).150 Finally, the new
general counsel, by virtue of their seniority and career horizon, did not have
an expectation of ever returning to their law firms. Although the positions
were new, and thus entailed considerable uncertainty, a move in-house was
a one-way street. The move was either a launching pad into other senior
positions within the senior management of the client (the “launching pad”
thesis) or into retirement.151
As elite in-house legal departments gradually grew, associate general
counsel and more junior positions were filled from the ranks of Big Law.
General counsel, themselves products of Big Law, were familiar with large
law firms’ personnel and valued the firms’ training and mentoring, which inhouse departments were not in a position to offer due to their relatively small
size and orientation.152 Over time, such lateral hiring was facilitated by the
increased competitive realities of Big Law, as some junior partners and senior
associates, eager to escape oppressive billable hours, pressure to develop a
book of business, and glass ceilings, flocked in-house.153

145. See Wilkins, supra note 65, at 2076–104 (describing the traditional stable, as well as
the modern unstable, typical Big Law–client relationship).
146. Id.
147. See DeMott, supra note 11, at 961–65.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Notably, Big Law’s training and mentoring is in decline. See Susan Saab Fortney,
Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects
of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 281–82 (2000); Eli Wald, BigLaw
Identity Capital: Pink and Blue, Black and White, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2509, 2539–41 (2015).
153. Wald, supra note 55, at 409–19.
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DeMott’s mobility framework suggests that late third-generation movers
from Big Law to in-house departments were likely driven more by “law firm
contrast” and “fit” considerations than by “economic” and “launching pad”
reasons. Unlike early movers, who were often senior partners leaving Big
Law to become general counsel, later movers were typically younger junior
partners and senior associates, escaping the increasingly competitive practice
realities of Big Law. The escalating billable expectations, longer and
multilayered partnership tracks, and more explicit book-of-business
expectations that required nonbillable hours have led to longer total work
hours, stress, and a reduced ability to strike a reasonable, let alone desirable,
work-life balance.154 For some Big Law lawyers, these increasingly
competitive realities were oppressive and the “law firm contrast” thesis was
a significant draw. Even if ample information was not readily available, they
hoped that in-house practice would prove more relaxed.155 Relatedly, some
Big Law movers hoped to find a better fit in-house compared with Big Law,
both in terms of job expectations and work-life balance.156
In contrast, “economic” and “launching pad” reasons were likely less
relevant. Some in-house positions offered handsome compensation but
information about economic incentives was lacking, often leaving
individuals to negotiate based on incomplete information.157 Similarly, late
third-generation in-house lawyers often could not effectively plot career
trajectories out of in-house positions because information was scarce.158 Yet
this was not necessarily a significant disadvantage. For those looking to
leave Big Law, a move in-house offered if not a clear career pathway then at
least a new position and time to figure out their future either as a permanent
in-house attorney or at another position down the road.
Notably, while these late third-generation moves in-house were still
grounded in an ongoing relationship with the entity client—typically an inhouse department will recruit a junior partner or a mid-level to senior
associate who had worked on its matters while in Big Law—the hiring was
somewhat haphazard. Even as they were beginning to micromanage Big Law
staffing in terms of who worked on their matters and how many billable hours
they were allowed to charge,159 in-house legal departments did not select the
Big Law lawyers initially assigned to work on their matters by the large law
firms. Thus, in-house departments ended up laterally recruiting whomever
the large law firms assigned to work on their matters. Similarly, Big Law
lawyers moving in-house knew relatively little about in-house practice.
These lawyers’ knowledge was limited to what they learned about the in154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See generally Eli Wald, In-House Pay: Are Salaries, Stock Options, and Health
Benefits a “Fee” Subject to a Reasonableness Requirement and Why the Answer Constitutes
the Opening Shot in a Class War Between Lawyer-Employees and Lawyer-Professionals, 20
NEV. L.J. 243 (2019).
158. See generally id.
159. Liggio, supra note 5, at 1217–22.
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house departments and their attorneys while representing them as outside
counsel in part because law schools offered virtually no relevant
coursework.160 The lawyers had no influence over their assignments in Big
Law, which in turn opened the door to and led them in-house.161 From the
perspective of the Big Law attorney, the relationship with a would-be entity
client employer was near completely random: one would join a large law
firm, would be assigned (or not) to work with a firm partner for a large entity
client, and a few years later might develop a relationship with that client and
receive a lateral offer.162
Moreover, in this sense, a move in-house was not only random but also
motivated by negative reasoning and realities in Big Law and incomplete
information about in-house practice realities and career trajectories. Large
law firms’ junior partners and associates moved in-house not because they
knew and desired the positions but by default to escape practice realities at
large law firms and business development pressures and to seek shorter hours
and enhanced equality.163 The maturation of in-house positions at large
entity clients and the expansion of in-house practice outside large entity
clients, however, have altered the nature and number of available career
tracks for in-house lawyers.
1. Two-Way Streets: Big Law and In-House Lateral Moves
The evolving relationship between in-house legal departments and outside
counsel has become a two-way street,164 with in-house lawyers returning to
Big Law for several reasons. First, the growth of in-house departments and
positions and the expanding ranks and identities of in-house lawyers created,
over time, a pool of possible Big Law recruits. Rather than employing a
single senior, older general counsel, in-house legal departments increasingly
feature a diverse pool of lawyers, some of whom are in their thirties and
forties as opposed to near retirement age. These younger in-house lawyers
are attractive to large law firms, which are seeking to better understand inhouse decision-making and benefit from the connections of former in-house
lawyers in corporate America. Yet, why would some in-house lawyers
choose to go back to, and others move to, Big Law?

160. See generally ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL, BECOMING IN-HOUSE COUNSEL: A GUIDE FOR
LAW STUDENTS AND RECENT GRADUATES (2013), https://www.acc.com/sites/default/files/
resources/vl/membersonly/InfoPAK/19654_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/CYG7-FSTV].
161. Id.
162. Wald, supra note 55, at 409–19.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Michele Gorman, Why In-House Attys Ditch the Corporate World for Law
Firms, LAW360 (Nov. 30, 2018, 7:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1100522/whyin-house-attys-ditch-the-corporate-world-for-law-firms [http://perma.cc/3V43-5NFE]; Sue
Reisinger, Two Veteran In-House Counsel Talk About Why They Moved to Law Firms,
LAW.COM (Feb. 12, 2019, 5:38 PM), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2019/02/12/twoveteran-in-house-counsel-talk-about-why-they-moved-to-law-firms/ [https://perma.cc/ZS8L78XB]; see also Wilkins, supra note 59, at 253.

1790

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

Consider the “law firm contrast” rationale. Recall that some thirdgeneration Big Law lawyers left large law firms to escape their “eat what you
kill” culture, the billable hour oppression, and the need to develop a book of
business, whereas others left seeking more equitable work environments.
The in-house and related corporate work realities and culture, however, are
more complex and sometimes less of a Big Law contrast than imagined by
lawyers. Some of these in-house lawyers were disappointed and even
disillusioned by in-house practice realities, which, although free of the
billable hour and book-of-business concerns, featured their own demanding
challenges such as soft hours, travel, and a foreign business culture often
viewing lawyers as outsiders and naysayers.165
While elite general counsel had mostly established themselves as respected
and trusted C-suite advisors and executives by the 2000s, other in-house
lawyers were still fighting third-generation battles to establish trust and
overcome the perception of being part of a negative cost center. For some,
the business culture, in which lawyers were sometimes held in low esteem,
was hard to adjust to166 compared to that of large law firms, in which Big
Law lawyers were considered top dogs—both internally vis-à-vis support
staff and nonlawyers and externally vis-à-vis other members of the legal
profession.167 In sum, because information was not readily available about
in-house practice, lawyers moved in-house only to discover that the law firm
contrast was more complex and less of an obvious reason to leave Big
Law.168
Similarly, while in-house departments feature some greater equality—for
example, 25 percent of all general counsel of Fortune 500 entity clients are
women, a higher percentage than for equity partners in Big Law169—inhouse departments and their corporate hosts feature their own equality
concerns and challenges. As it turns out, while corporate America quickly
promoted women lawyers to top positions as general counsel, it was less
willing and able to change its male-dominated culture in some historically
male-dominated industries such as manufacturing.170
Next, the “economic” thesis has proved to be more complex as well. While
in-house legal departments offer competitive packages to lure Big Law
lawyers and spare movers the need to worry about the billable hour and books
of business, they include their own challenges. Most notably, in-house legal
departments have no expectations of quasi-tenure in the form of promotion
to partnership. Quite the contrary, like many corporate actors, in-house
lawyers are at-will employees and can, and do, get fired when entity clients

165. Wald, supra note 55, at 424–39.
166. Id.
167. NELSON, supra note 68, at 127–58.
168. Wald, supra note 55, at 424–53.
169. Wilkins, supra note 50.
170. See generally ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN
(1993 ed.).
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downsize.171 To be sure, large law firms also let associates, and even
partners, go, but the likelihood of being fired is higher and, indeed, part of
the norm at corporate entities. Related risk factors include unpredictable
business conditions and the volatility of stocks and stock options.
Moreover, the proliferation of career tracks in Big Law has created new
ways to mitigate the downside of book-of-business expectations—for
example, lawyers can become income partners as opposed to equity partners.
This, to be clear, is not to dismiss concerns about who gets on what track at
large law firms.172 But the point remains that if part of the “contrast” and
“economic” motivations to move from a large law firm to an in-house legal
department had to do with not having a big book of business and the fear of
not making “partner,” Big Law now offers career opportunities that do not
require rainmaking skills or “up or out” promotion to equity partner.
As the Big Law world became more competitive, and placed an emphasis
on books of business, for a transitionary period, large law firms were eager
to have their former lawyers return as partners, which made the “economic”
thesis a compelling reason to go back to Big Law. Big Law assumed and
hoped these in-house lawyers would come back with ample business from
the in-house legal department they just left behind and relationships they
formed in the business world while working in-house. As it turned out, this
wishful thinking did not always play out as planned. While some in-house
lawyers met these rosy expectations, others did not. The proliferation of inhouse positions and ranks meant that returnees often had specialized roles—
for example, as associate general counsel for intellectual property or for labor
and employment law—and therefore did not influence the flow of work from
their former entity clients. Moreover, having spent time away from Big Law,
they sometimes found its culture hard to readjust to. Thus, after a quick
sobering period, Big Law became more discerning and brought back former
lawyers for probationary of-counsel positions, pending a proven track record
of a book of business, or as-needed to fill specialty needs created by client
demands and lateral moves by partners and experienced associates.
Consequently, fourth-generation in-house practice features a robust twoway street, including not only “Big Law X to in-house to Big Law X” tracks
but also “Big Law X to in-house to Big Law Y” moves.173 The evolution of
this career trajectory, from a one-way to a two-way street, continues to
legitimize and sustain the elite status of in-house practice at the same time as
it enhances the standing of Big Law positions.
2. In-House Lateral Moves
An emerging in-house lateral market, including both “elite in-house A to
elite in-house B” and “elite in-house A to nonelite general counsel or even
171. Robert E. Rosen, “We’re All Consultants Now”: How Change in Client
Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal
Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 642 (2002).
172. Wald, supra note 152, at 2529–54.
173. See supra note 164.
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nonelite in-house” moves, reflects both supply and demand forces. On the
supply side, the growth of in-house positions and their elite status, combined
with the extended tracks in Big Law and the decreased probability of making
equity partner, created a pool of increasingly well-informed lawyers who,
after relatively short stints in Big Law, were ready to go in-house and then
enter the in-house lateral market. To be sure, some lawyers spend more time
in Big Law and others move in-house seeking more permanent positions. Yet
Big Law and in-house practice realities have helped create a large and
growing pool of lateral in-house lawyers, akin to the lateral market that
emerged in Big Law beginning in the 1990s and maturing through the
twenty-first century.174 This pool consists of lawyers who, after spending a
few years in Big Law, take an in-house legal position with the expectation
that, after several years at the entity client, they will laterally move to another
in-house legal department at another employer.
On the demand side, in-house departments have grown more experienced
and sophisticated and need not, and do not, settle for haphazard lateral
pickups from Big Law. While large law firms continue to offer relatively
well-trained and well-mentored lawyers (although that promise has been
somewhat tarnished in recent years),175 some in-house departments seek
lawyers with in-house experience for both general counsel and other in-house
positions, often from other industries, for two reasons. First, some in-house
lawyers have signed noncompete provisions preventing them, as a condition
precedent for receiving stock and stock options, from working for business
competitors in the same industry.176 Second, the skill set of specialized inhouse lawyers, for example, as intellectual property or labor and employment
law experts, is relatively transferable irrespective of the business industry of
the entity client.177 Moreover, some in-house departments have started
offering internships for both law students and recent graduates as well as
limited entry-level positions.178
The emergence of in-house lateral markets, back to Big Law and to other
in-house positions, is not the first time the corporate sphere of the legal
profession has experienced the development of a robust lateral market. For
nearly a century, Big Law operated under an implied but well-accepted
gentlemanly agreement, in which large law firms promoted partners from
within their own ranks and avoided lateral cherry-picking, making mobility

174. See generally ROBERT W. HILLMAN & ALLISON MARTIN RHODES, HILLMAN ON
LAWYER MOBILITY: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF PARTNER WITHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRM
BREAKUPS, at 1:1–1:8 (2d ed. 2016); Robert W. Hillman, The Hidden Costs of Lawyer
Mobility: Of Law Firms, Law Schools, and the Education of Lawyers, 91 KY. L.J. 299 (2002).
175. See supra note 152.
176. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); Wald, supra note
157, at 265–68.
177. Wald, supra note 55, at 424–39.
178. SANDY BROWN & HARIS KHAN, MINORITY CORP. COUNSEL ASS’N, THE IN-HOUSE
LEGAL INTERNSHIP PROGRAM HANDBOOK: A GUIDE FOR DEVELOPMENT, IMPLEMENTATION,
AND ASSESSMENT 1–2 (2010), https://www.mcca.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Full
_Legal_Internship_Program_Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR79-CQB2].
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among Big Law firms a frowned upon, rare phenomenon.179 In the mid1970s, that attitude began to change. In a string of decisions, the U.S.
Supreme Court removed restrictions on advertisement, solicitation,
competitiveness, and the flow of information in the marketplace for legal
services.180 Trade journals began collecting, regularly publishing, and
ranking associate salaries and profits per partner.181 The number of large law
firms increased and the firms continued to grow, loosening old networks and
social norms.182 Mobility became the name of the game, with associates,
partners, and sometimes whole units shifting from one law firm to another.183
While not necessarily increasing transparency about promotion criteria,184
the emergence of lateral Big Law markets legitimated increased competitive
conditions and a greater flow of information about large law firms’ practice
realities. It also normalized lateral movement, turning mobility into part and
parcel of Big Law practice. The development of a lateral in-house market
suggests similar future trends in in-house practice. That is, the emergence of
two-way streets in and out of Big Law and of a robust lateral in-house market
suggest that over time significantly more information will become available
for in-house lawyers as they plot their careers and that accordingly mobility
will become more common and more explicitly strategic, in turn making inhouse practice more competitive.
3. Moves from In-House to Business Positions
Whereas first-generation and early third-generation general counsel were
driven in part to leave judicial posts by the possibility of taking on senior
management positions with an entity client, the Big Law equity partner to
general counsel move has become less likely in the fourth-generation era.
Entity clients now recruit experienced general counsel from a robust lateral
market and have less of a reason to recruit a Big Law partner for the position.
Moreover, Big Law partners in the twenty-first century are more likely to be
subject-matter experts than long-standing generalists capable of becoming
general counsel. Yet, for Big Law lawyers looking to move in-house,
179. SMIGEL, supra note 22, at 57 (“[Competition] for lawyers among the large firms in
New York City is limited in two major ways: the firms will not pirate an employee from
another law office, and they maintain a gentlemen’s agreement to pay the same beginning
salary . . . .”). Until the late 1970s, information about compensation was scarce, and lawyers
did not shop around for better offers.
It is interesting to note that few associates know the exact meaning of partnership.
This is especially true of the new associates, but even the senior associate is not
always correct in his judgment about what a partnership really means. For example,
they do not know how much money they will be making as partners.
Id. at 91–92. See generally PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS IN THE STREET: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
GREAT WALL STREET LAW FIRMS (1973).
180. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar,
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
181. Wald, supra note 53, at 2259.
182. Wald, supra note 23, at 1852–63.
183. See generally Hillman, supra note 174.
184. Wald, supra note 152, at 2544–47.
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additional business tracks have evolved within entity clients outside of the
C-suite. Some in-house departments are centralized, with the general counsel
or the CLO at the top of the internal chain of command. Other entities feature
a decentralized scheme, in which entity lawyers work outside of the in-house
department and report directly to nonlawyers.185 While this structure
exacerbates pressures to act as a team player because of the absence of a legal
culture traditionally more encouraging of independent exercise of
professional judgment,186 it also opens the door to new business
opportunities and advancement within the entity—outside of senior
management positions in the C-suite—as decentralized in-house lawyers
become more intimately familiar with the working and business culture of
the entity.
Similarly, some in-house lawyers take business positions outside of the Csuite, such as department heads and vice presidents, thinking of a move inhouse as the first step in transitioning to the business world, taking advantage
of their legal training, and benefitting from the demise of the MBA degree
and its credential power.187 As opposed to early third-generation movers, a
typical in-house lawyer is younger, having spent only a few years at a large
law firm. As such, such a lawyer is less likely to be viewed inside the entity
client as a naysayer or an outsider and thus more likely to be perceived as a
committed team member,188 making a move into a business unit more
plausible and seamless.
4. Nonelite General Counsel and In-House Positions
Finally, as in-house positions expand outside large entity clients and the
perception of in-house practice shifts from negative “did not make partner”
to highly prestigious and coveted, large and mid-sized entities create new inhouse positions and may staff them with lawyers outside of Big Law and the
growing in-house lateral market. The significance of this development
should not be understated because, even in the context of stratified in-house
worlds, this trend blurs the traditional lines between the corporate and
individual hemispheres.189
In turn, the lateral in-house market and new career tracks help frame and
shape the expectations and career trajectories of Big Law lawyers, in-house
attorneys, and law students alike. Those interested in in-house practice
185. Kelley, supra note 89, at 1197.
186. Rosen, supra note 171, at 652.
187. John Byrne, It’s Official: The M.B.A. Degree Is in Crisis, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2019,
6:09 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/poetsandquants/2019/08/20/its-official-the-mbadegree-is-in-crisis/ [http://perma.cc/DJE6-WWS5]; Kelsey Gee, M.B.A. Applications Decline
at Harvard, Wharton, Other Elite Schools as Degree Loses Luster, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2018,
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/m-b-a-applications-keep-falling-in-u-s-this-yearhitting-even-elite-schools-1538366461 [http://perma.cc/B5FL-AP92].
188. Wald, supra note 55, at 424–39.
189. David B. Wilkins, Some Realism About Legal Realism for Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN
PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 25, 33 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather
eds., 2012).
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should research a Big Law firm’s client base, if not in terms of specific clients
then certainly in terms of industries and size of entity clients, before
accepting a position, even as an associate. At a firm, associates should pay
attention not only to partners’ star power and rainmaking capabilities but also
to client portfolios and target partners with a mix of clients and desirable
portfolios. For example, instead of relying on random work assignments for
entity clients, interested associates should network early and often, both
within and outside of the firm, with an eye toward being well positioned to
learn about in-house opportunities. This development, however, exacerbates
concerns about Big Law transparency, the availability of cultural capital
insights, and unequal flow of information in terms of who gets access to
valuable information necessary for an informed, strategic career design190:
whereas some unsophisticated associates would spend their time working
hard to meet billable expectations, happy to have the job and assuming their
careers will evolve naturally, other savvy associates would gather
information, network, and pursue strategic in-house opportunities.
At in-house legal departments, some lawyers will continue to seek out
positions laterally as an alternative to Big Law, with an eye toward a
relatively stable, permanent in-house position. Others, given the emergence
of a savvy lateral market, will pay attention not only to soft hours and firmspecific investments but also acquire a skill set transferable outside the entity
client, which feeds into and helps make in-house practice increasingly
competitive.
At law schools, for those seeking entry into Big Law, the recipe has long
remained the same: get into the best law school, earn the best possible GPA
and class standing, and excel at extracurricular activities.191 If the student
hopes to practice in-house, notwithstanding the fact that the majority of inhouse positions are still not available straight out of law school,192 there
exists immersion in business law coursework (even for those interested in
litigation, intellectual property, etc.) and the recent related corporate law
programs certification phenomenon,193 possible interdisciplinary credentials
(not necessarily MBAs but degrees in business-related fields),194 and
extracurricular paths (such as in-house internships).195

190. David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers:
Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms,
84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1606 (1998); see also Wald, supra note 152, at 2536–47.
191. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 190, at 1653.
192. See generally BROWN & KHAN, supra note 178.
193. See generally Wald, supra note 34.
194. Id.
195. See generally BROWN & KHAN, supra note 178.
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C. The Future of Corporate Legal Practice
Prophecy, teaches the Talmud, is for fools,196 and yet the past and present
of the in-house–Big Law relationship offer some clues as to the future of the
fifth generation of in-house practice.
First, as the lateral in-house labor market matures over time, a new
generation of in-house lawyers will rise, one that has not been socialized in
and beholden to Big Law and does not think of Big Law services as a familiar
and obvious default. Such in-house lawyers may be more open-minded and
less risk averse about experimenting with new modes of outside legal
services. Sure enough, these new modes of outside legal services are upon
us, including nonelite legal services, legal services provided by nonlawyers,
and legal services increasingly utilizing artificial intelligence.197 Yet, “sea
change” rhetoric notwithstanding, the current fourth generation of in-house
counsel has proven generally reluctant to wholeheartedly embrace
alternatives to the traditional Big Law model for outside legal services.198
As we have seen, a self-sustaining, symbiotic codependency between inhouse and outside counsel, combined with the risk aversion and incentive
structure faced by in-house lawyers, strongly suggests that, in the near future,
large law firms have little to fear in terms of losing continued, stable demand
for their core outside legal services. In-house counsel have little reason to
abandon or sever ties with large law firms. Yet, as the paradigmatic fifthgeneration in-house counsel spends fewer years in Big Law, she is more
likely to at least be open to experimenting with alternative forms of corporate
legal services. Thus, in the mid-to-long-term range, large law firms should
expect even more competition in the market for corporate legal services.199
Second, a generation less indoctrinated by Big Law and socialized inhouse may also be open-minded about trying out new models for in-house
legal departments’ structure and organization. For example, rather than
mimicking the structure of large law firms or the current symbiotic model,
some in-house departments may recruit and retain a high-level team of
experts, a nimble high-end group that can then use a sea of paralegals and
outsourced or temporary “on-demand” lawyers to assist in implementation
of projects currently handled by Big Law. Once again, such experimentation
is likely to begin on a small scale and entail a lengthy trial-and-error-period.
196. Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Baba Bathra: Folio 12a, COME & HEAR, www.comeand-hear.com/bababathra/bababathra_12.html [https://perma.cc/WM4H-6VWC] (last visited
Mar. 17, 2020).
197. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE END OF LEGAL
SERVICES (2010); John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How
Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041 (2014); Milton C. Regan & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and
Porous Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137
(2010).
198. See generally Wilkins, supra note 50.
199. Hugh A. Simons & Gina Passarella, The Rise (and Fall?) of In-House Counsel,
LAW.COM (Feb. 25, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/02/25/therise-and-fall-of-in-house-counsel [https://perma.cc/BG2Y-T4FT] (exploring the outsourcing
of routine tasks by in-house legal departments to outside service providers).
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But over time, in-house legal departments are likely to grow more diverse in
terms of their organization and structure.
Third, for a century now, critics have called on corporate lawyers to be
mindful of the opportunity in the law and act as intermediaries between their
entity clients’ interests and the public interest.200 In particular, some
commentators, academics, and practitioners alike have called for and debated
the desirability of corporate lawyers acting as gatekeepers.201 Irrespective of
the normative persuasiveness of such claims, the next generation of in-house
counsel is likely to find them less feasible and less appealing. The ongoing
integration of the in-house and outside counsels’ worlds via two-street tracks
and increased mobility is likely to only intensify and empower market-based
service ideologies of professionalism and undercut alternatives to them. The
“we are all consultants” state of mind and professional ethos202 is taking
place while the integration of the worlds of in-house and outside counsel is
weakening the professional, public-minded identity of lawyers, and in-house
lawyers are moving closer to the service model of corporate executives.
All of this does not mean the end of Big Law or the decline of in-house
legal departments,203 but it likely means continued fierce competition in the
market for corporate legal services and the need to remain as nimble as
possible to compete with emerging new alternatives to the traditional model
of corporate legal services.
III. PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ABOUT THE INCREASINGLY INTEGRATED
WORLDS OF IN-HOUSE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL
The standard story of in-house practice and the relationship between inhouse counsel and Big Law lawyers is one of fierce competition, a zero-sum
game in which the gains of in-house lawyers and, in particular, elite general
counsel have come at the expense of Big Law partners.204 However, the
practice realities and relationship of in-house and Big Law lawyers are far
more complex and can more accurately be described as symbiotic—sharing
the ethos of service and ideology of client-centered professionalism.205
200. See generally Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, 39 AM. L. REV. 555
(1905); Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron,
35 CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2003); William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the
Professional Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453 (2006)
[hereinafter Simon, After Confidentiality]; William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The
Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and the Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 243 (1998) [hereinafter Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair].
201. Compare JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2006), Sung Hui Kim, Inside Lawyers: Friends or Gatekeepers?, 84 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1867 (2016) [hereinafter Kim, Inside Lawyers], and Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of
Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983 (2005)
[hereinafter Kim, Banality of Fraud], with Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Who Let You into the
House?, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 359.
202. Rosen, supra note 171, at 660–79.
203. Ribstein, supra note 1, at 797–802.
204. Id.
205. See supra Part I.
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In the past, the worlds of in-house and Big Law were separated. First,
during the second generation of in-house lawyers, they were hierarchical,
with Big Law on top and in-house practice at the bottom. Then, during the
third- and fourth-generation eras, they were parallel, with equity partners and
general counsel competing and vying for power. Now, the worlds of outside
counsel and in-house lawyers have begun to merge and are increasingly
integrated, which is reflected in the shift from a one-way street from Big Law
to in-house to a two-way street, the emergence of a robust lateral in-house
market, and the recruitment of law students by in-house departments as
interns.
Elite general counsel claim lawyer-statesperson status, a
phenomenon only likely to gather steam as the flow of information about
emerging in-house tracks grows. Notably, the gradual convergence and
integration of the in-house and Big Law worlds is taking place while the inhouse universe itself continues to expand and stratify.
The growing integration of the elite in-house and Big Law worlds is not
surprising. Unlike the era in which large law firms deliberately built their
elite status at the expense of the old, first-generation in-house lawyers,206
third- and fourth-generation in-house counsel and Big Law lawyers were
generally aligned in educational background, practice orientation, and
professional ethos. Both served large corporate entities, practiced in similar
areas, adopted a business approach to professionalism, and understood their
roles as a client-centered service.207
This alignment ought not mask some tensions and friction points. Big Law
equity partners, for example, perceive some fourth-generation in-house
lawyers as poorly trained because they left Big Law as mid-level associates
and are now counsel who do not understand and cannot practice law at the
highest level.208 In-house counsel, in turn, perceive some Big Law lawyers
as insufficiently informed about the business world and the actual needs of
entity clients and driven by billable hours and book-of-business expectations
in the outdated “business” model of Big Law.209 Yet these quibbles
notwithstanding, the core professional values and ethos of elite in-house and
Big Law lawyers are increasingly similar, grounded in a client-centered,
business-model conception of a service industry.210
Notably, the growing integration of the worlds of in-house and Big Law
may spread the dominant business ethos and model of professionalism even
further. Big Law socialization and practice realities set the stage for in-house

206. See supra Part I.B.
207. See generally Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why
Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995).
208. Supra note 152 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Leigh Jones & Vanessa Blum, What Bugs In-House Lawyers About Outside
Counsel?: Here’s What They Said—and More, LAW.COM (Sept. 27, 2019, 2:24 PM),
https://www.law.com/2019/09/27/what-bugs-in-house-lawyers-about-outside-counsel-hereswhat-they-said-and-more [http://perma.cc/Z3FV-XLCJ].
210. See generally Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Being Good Lawyers: A Relational
Approach to Law Practice, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 601 (2016).
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loyalty and service.211 But now in-house lawyers are bringing back the more
explicit business ethic—“we are all consultants”—to Big Law and nonelite
lawyers moving in-house may later bring the in-house ethos back to outside
counsel practice. This growing affinity between in-house and Big Law
culture and habits is indicated by complaints about in-house lawyers and their
understandings of their roles in ways similar to complaints about the roles of
outside counsel. Judge Stanley Sporkin’s famous, or perhaps infamous
query—where were the lawyers?212—was originally directed at outside
counsel.213 Yet recently, it has been invoked about in-house lawyers as
well.214
What are the normative implications of this integration? On the one hand,
the convergence of elite in-house and Big Law practice may be a positive
development. In-house lawyers were operating outside the mainstream of
the legal profession, for example, not engaging in pro bono and having their
own bar associations, continuing legal education events, etc.215 To the extent
that Ben Heineman and others’ vision of elite in-house counsel commitment
to engage with the bar is plausible,216 the growing affinity may be desirable.
Furthermore, if in-house lawyers are embraced by the entire legal profession
and increasingly think of themselves as lawyers, then they may be more
likely to act as gatekeeper professionals in appropriate circumstances.
On the other hand, the growing integration may obscure important
differences between in-house lawyers and other lawyers, such as the
difference between lawyer-employees and lawyer-professionals.217
Historically, lawyers were (and are) professionals in at least two senses:
commitment to the public good and independence grounded in formal
education, esoteric knowledge, and elevated status.218 Employees, lawyeremployees included, blur these professional features. They are committed to
their employers (usually a for-profit employer) and they lack independence,
even if nonlawyers do not directly manage the manner in which in-house
lawyers practice law.219 These trends, the erosion of commitment to the
public good and decreased independence, are not unique to in-house lawyers,
but in-house lawyers experience them more acutely. These differences, in
211. Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Relational Infrastructure of Law Firm Regulation:
Is the Death of Big Law Greatly Exaggerated?, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 109, 111–20 (2013).
212. See Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) (noting
that there were “literally scores of accountants and lawyers” involved in the savings and loan
case, Judge Sporkin asked pointedly: “Where were these professionals . . . ? Why didn’t any
of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the transactions? Where also were the
outside accountants and attorneys when these transactions were effectuated?”).
213. See generally Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair, supra note 200.
214. See Kim, Inside Lawyers, supra note 201, at 1867–68 (describing the role of General
Motors’s in-house lawyers in mishandling its 2014 recall).
215. See, e.g., Our History, supra note 120.
216. See DUBEY & KRIPALANI, supra note 93, at 163–70; HEINEMAN, supra note 93, at 317–
57; VEASEY & DI GUGLIELMO, supra note 93, at 97–130.
217. See Wald, supra note 157, at 277–300.
218. See generally Gordon, supra note 40; Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975).
219. See Wald, supra note 157, at 282–89.
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turn, raise questions about the bar and its regulation in areas such as
confidentiality, fees, and termination because rules of conduct meant to guide
the conduct of lawyer professionals may ill-fit the practice of lawyeremployees.220
Notably, the issue is not only one of blurred roles and conceptual lines.
The growing integration of corporate law practice, bringing in-house and
outside corporate counsel closer together under a unified businessprofessional ideological umbrella, may undercut the ability of all corporate
lawyers to practice as gatekeepers and fulfill expectations and roles long
advocated for by critics and commentators alike.221
Arguably, all lawyers, not just corporate lawyers, have experienced a loss
of commitment to the public good and have veered too much in the direction
of client-centered service,222 such that what we need are discussions about
new brands of professionalism, in which lawyers, all lawyers, are
gatekeepers, or at least more open-minded about conceptions of role other
than the one shaped by client-centered service ideology.223 Similarly,
arguably all lawyers have experienced an increased lack of independence,
such that what we need is a new conception of independence suited to the
twenty-first century practice realities.224 Or maybe we do not. Perhaps
corporate lawyers, and indeed all lawyers, are ready to abandon their role as
public citizens with a special commitment to pursuing justice.225 Either way,
perhaps the growing integration of the corporate sphere of legal services will
serve as a catalyst for a long-overdue discussion about the role of lawyers as
professionals with responsibilities to clients, the legal system, and the public
interest.

220. Id. at 289–300.
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223. Id. at 623.
224. Gordon, supra note 40, at 68–83.
225. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). Legal scholars have
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